IN my Sept. 30, 2022, column, I suggested that the (negative) memories of Martial Law 1972 (and EDSA 1986 as an extension of it) have become insignificant in contemporary politics. Politicians have moved on and, in fact, switched sides from being antiin 1986 to pro-Marcos in 2022.

This is easily explained by the chameleon-like character of politicians; there are no permanent allies or enemies, just permanent (selfish) interests.

The public, however, do not have any obvious self-interest in switching from anti- to proMarcos. What happened between 1986 and 2022? How can this be explained?

I will assert that the detestable aspects of martial law have ceased to frighten the Filipino people. Martial law per se is not evil. Even the framers of the 1987 Constitution saw it fit — despite their collective phobia towards martial law — to retain the president’s power to declare martial law, albeit with all sorts of safety measures to prevent a repeat of 1972 when then-outgoing President Ferdinand E. Marcos (his last term was set to end in 1973) was able to stay on as chief executive indefinitely as a consequence.

[N.B.: Martial law was officially lifted in 1981 but by that time the country had a new constitution and Marcos Sr. was no longer hobbled by the previous 1935 Constitution that set a limit of two consecutive fouryear terms for the president. Marcos Sr. ran anew and won in the presidential elections of 1981, giving him a fresh term until 1987. However, Marcos Sr. called for snap elections slated for February 1986 to prove to his American benefactors that he still had the mandate of the Filipino people.]

Thus, the most objectionable aspect of martial law in the previous 1935 Constitution was its power to extend the incumbent president in office indefinitely. Moreover, related to that, the Supreme Court decided on Sept. 17, 1974, that the declaration of martial law was “a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” The president, under the 1935 Constitution, had the sole power to declare martial law and could do so beyond any challenge before the courts.

This problematic aspect of martial law under the 1935 Constitution has since been rectified by safeguards inserted in the 1987 Constitution. Martial law may be declared in case of invasion and rebellion, but its (initial) effectivity cannot exceed 60 days. The president is also obligated to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours of the declaration. Congress can then decide to concur with the president’s decision to declare martial law and extend its effectivity beyond 60 days. However, the Supreme Court has the power to review the factual basis of the declaration of martial law.

The entire country experienced all the safeguards in place when President Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law (in Mindanao) as a consequence of the so-called Marawi Siege in 2017. It served to allay any fears the Filipino people had towards the declaration of martial law. Duterte, in a limited sense, exorcised the ghosts of martial law.

Another important factor here is the manufacture of a pretext to declare martial law. If any president (morbidly) dreams of declaring martial law, where will the justification come from? The communist insurgency is practically in its last gasps. The government has come to terms with the most powerful Muslim secessionist groups in the south.

It is hard to imagine the (low intensity) conflict with China over disputed waters rising to the level of a pretext for the declaration of martial law. There is simply no foreseeable justification for martial law on the horizon.

Martial Law 1972 has really been relegated to the role of academic history lessons inside the classrooms. Even the visions of politicized elements in the academe to use the horror stories of Martial Law 1972 as a tool for influencing contemporary political outcomes have fizzled out. Martial Law 1972 morbid tales no longer have the power to step out of the textbooks to influence ballots.

In fact, a serious dilemma of those peddling the grisly stories of state violence related to Martial Law 1972 comes from the particulars of the human rights victims themselves. Were they or were they not involved in the armed communist movement to bring down the government? If the answer is “yes,” are they “poor victims” of the dictator or are they gallant warriors of the (unsuccessful) communist revolution? If the human rights victims are mostly innocent civilians, then the communist narrative of a robust revolution against the Marcos regime sufficiently crumbles.

The human rights victims must choose between a narrative of fierce revolution versus a feeble communist movement, between heroes against a bankrupt dictatorship versus poor victims of a powerful regime.

**** Requiescat in pace, Atty. John Baroña, UP Vanguard Class of 1990.