I’M citing a NATO report that emanated from Canada in November 2021 when President Rodrigo Duterte was in Malacañang. The purpose is to inform the readership that the Philippines is considered a “major non-NATO ally” and what it means for the country currently under the gun from the People’s Republic of China. The contents here are from the perspective of NATO. For brevity and impartiality, I paraphrased the contents of the sources.

As tensions continue to rise in the Indo-Pacific, President Duterte turned his attention toward realigning with the United States and allies. This shift in policy opened up fresh opportunities for the US and its allies to strengthen their bonds in Asia. President Duterte realized that trying to strike a deal with Beijing might be a less effective strategy than previously thought. His reversal was the flip side of his expressed intent in 2016 to align with Russia and China.

The US considers the Philippines a “major non-NATO ally,” giving the country that designation in October 2023 that includes a status of military and economic privilege with the US. Major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation. The MNNA designation is a powerful symbol of the close relationship the US shares with those countries and demonstrates its deep respect for the friendship for the countries to which it is extended.

While MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments to the designated country. (In the case of the Philippines, the Mutual Defense Treaty entails security commitments.) Privileges resulting from MNNA designation under 22 US Code §2321k:

– Eligible for loans of material, supplies, or equipment for cooperative research, development, testing or evaluation purposes.

– Eligible as a location for USowned War Reserve Stockpiles to be placed on its territory outside of US military facilities.

– Can enter into agreements with the United States for the cooperative furnishing of training on a bilateral or multilateral basis, if the financial arrangements are reciprocal and provide for reimbursement of all US direct costs.

– Eligible to the maximum extent feasible, for priority delivery of excess defense articles transferred under Section 516 of the US Foreign Assistance Act (if located on the southern or southeastern flank of NATO).

– Eligible for consideration to purchase depleted uranium ammunition.

Privileges resulting from MNNA designation under 10 USC §2350a:

– Eligible to enter into an MoU or other formal agreement with the US Department of Defense for the purpose of conducting cooperative research and development projects on defense equipment and munitions.

– Allows firms of a MNNA, as with NATO countries, to bid on contracts for maintenance, repair or overhaul of US Department of Defense equipment outside the United States.

– Allows funding to procure explosives detection devices and other counterterrorism research and development projects under the auspices of the Department of State’s technical support working group.

Currently 18 countries are designated as MNNAs under 22 USC §2321k and 10 USC §2350a:

Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, South Korea, Thailand and Tunisia. In addition, Pub. L. 107-228 provides that Taiwan shall be treated as an MNNA without formally designating it as such. The US recently vowed to defend the Philippines to include attacks against its armed forces and public vessels in the South China Sea. Despite then president Duterte’s early pronouncements to create strong bonds with China and Russia, the US and the Philippines remained steadfast allies.

The NATO 2030 global approach currently focuses on developing relations with four key partners in the Indo-Pacific: Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea. The Philippines’ backflip is a good starting point for NATO to look at the country as a strategic partner for its global approach. Since the Philippines has emphasized its relations with

China as being purely economic in nature, it may be within the realm of interest for strategic partners in the region who have less ties to China to bring the Philippines into these discussions with NATO. This would help provide a more comprehensive picture of security.”

Then President Duterte’s restoration of the Visiting Forces Agreement, which was then sustained by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. who brought to life the Enhanced Defense Cooperation (EDCA) agreement (both agreements being outgrowths of the Mutual Defense Treaty), gives NATO the chance to bring the Philippines in to enhance these partnerships and strengthen security in the IndoPacific region. Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is vital to all aspects of trade and energy, along with maintaining sea lines of communication (SLOC). This must be defended at all costs.

Filipinos largely favor relations with the United States over China based on a poll conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in early 2021. Eighty-seven percent of Filipino respondents said they would choose the US over China if they needed to align with a country, the highest proportion in all of Southeast Asia. That sentiment is mainly driven by the constant tensions between the two countries in the South China Sea that block wishful thinking for a PH-Sino alliance — or even a strategic partnership — anytime soon.

For the US-led NATO to maintain the balance of power in the IndoPacific, it must exploit the golden opportunity presented by the Philippines to promote mutual security and cooperation in the region. Similarly, the Philippines should exploit the opportunities provided by its MNNA status without delay. But while the Philippines continues to strive for peace under the auspices of its independent foreign policy, it must remain conscious of the security risks and threats to the country that requires strengthening its alliances and defense partnerships. Upholding its national interest and international law should be the primordial drivers of its sovereign decisions.

There are tectonic shifts now unfolding in the realms of geopolitics and geoeconomics. We must be able to maneuver through all that and emerge a skilled survivor.